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Abstract. Request route flooding attack is one of the main challenges in the security 
of Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) as it is easy to initiate and difficult to 
prevent. A malicious node can launch an attack simply by sending an excessively 
high number route request (RREQ) packets or useless data packets to non-existent 
destinations. As a result, the network is rendered useless as all its resources are used 
up to serve this storm of RREQ packets and hence unable to perform its nomal 
routing duty. Most existing research efforts on detecting such a flooding attack use 
the number of RREQs originated by node per unit time as the threshold to classify 
attackers. These algorithms work to some extent; however, they suffer high 
misdetection rate and reduce performance of the network. This paper proposes a 
new flooding attacks detection algorithm (FADA) for MANETs based on a machine 
learning approach. The algorithm relies on the route discovery history information of 
each node to capture similar characteristics and behaviors of nodes belonging to the 
same class to decide if a node is malicious. The paper also proposes a new flooding 
attacks prevention routing protocol (FAPRP) by extending the original AODV 
protocol and integrating FADA algorithm. The performance of the proposed solution 
is evaluated in terms of successful attack detection ratio, packet delivery ratio, and 
routing load in both normal and under RREQ attack scenarios using NS2 simulation. 
The simulation results show that the proposed FAPRP can detected over 99% of 
RREQ flooding attacks and performs better in terms of packet delivery ratio and, and 
routing load compared to existing solutions for RREQ flooding attacks. 





A Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET) [1] is a collection of wireless mobile devices 
(called nodes) that dynamically form a network in environments,  such as disaster 
rescue, urgent conference or military mission, without the support of a network 
infrastructure. The topology of the network may change frequently because nodes 
can join or leave the network at will. In a MANET, nodes coordinate among 
themselves to maintain the connections among them. Data transfer from a source 
node to a non-neighbor destination node is routed through mediate nodes. A node 
can act as a host and a router at the same time. A network routing protocol in a 
MANET specifies how nodes in the network communicate with each other. It enables 
the nodes to discover and maintain the routes between any two of them. Many 
routing protocols have been developed for MANETs such as ad hoc on-demand 
distance vector (AODV) [2], dynamic destination sequenced distance vector (DSDV) 
[3], and zone routing protocol (ZRP) [4]. They are classified into three groups: 
proactive, reactive, and hybrid routing protocols. With proactive routing protocols, 
the routes between nodes need to be established before data packets can be sent. 
These protocols are suitable for fixed topology networks. In contrary, reactive 
routing protocols are suitable for dynamic topology networks as nodes only try to 
discover routes on demand. In complex network topologies, hybrid routing protocols 
are often used [5]. MANETs are thus essential in infrastructureless situations for 
communication, however, they suffer from various types of Denial of Service (DoS) 
attacks that deny user of a service or a resource he/she would normally expect to 
receive. Disrupting the routing services at the network layer is an example of DoS 
[6][7] where a malicious node (MN) tries to deplete resources of other nodes. Other 
types of DoS include Blackhole [8], Sinkhole [9], Grayhole [10], Whirlwind [11], 
Wormhole [12] and Flooding attacks [13]. Flooding attack is a particular form of DoS 
attacks in MANETs where  malicious nodes mimic legitimate nodes in all aspects 
except that they do route discoveries much more frequently with the purpose of 
exhausting the processing resources of  other nodes. This type of attacks  is simple 
perform with on-demand routing protocols, typically as AODV [14]. Amongst 
HELLO, RREQ and DATA flooding attacks, route request (RREQ) flooding attacks is 
the most hazardous because it is easy to create a storm of request route packets and 
cause widespread damages. This paper focuses on the request route flooding attack. 
Previous researches on RREQ flooding attacks mainly focus on detection 
algorithms that rely on sending frequency of RREQ packets [15-20]. Every node uses 
a fixed (or dynamic) threshold value to detect an attack. The threshold is calculated 
based on the number of RREQs originated by node per unit time. A node labels a 
neighbor node malicious if it receives a higher number of RREQs than the allowed 
threshold from the neighbor. These algorithms, however, have many weaknesses in 
dealing with the dynamics of MANETs. These include: (1) An algorithm with a fixed 
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threshold is not flexible and is not able to cope with dynamic environments where 
optimal threshold values vary accordingly; (2) Even with dynamic threshold 
algorithms, where the threshold takes into account other factors such as network 
traffic, mobility speed, and frequency of malicious node attacks, misclassifications 
rates are still high. In high mobility environments, the connection state of network 
nodes changes very frequently, a node may not be able to capture accurate and 
adequate information to distill it to a single threshold ; (3) A normal node may be 
mistaken for a malicious node even if it legitimately sends out a high number of 
route requests in response to a high priority event; or (4) A malicious node may 
avoid the threshold detection mechanism simply by sending RREQ packets at a 
frequency just lower the threshold value. 
In this paper, we propose and investigate a different approach for detecting 
flooding attacks. Our solution relies on the route discovery history information of 
each node to classify a node as malicious or normal. The route discovery history of 
each node is represented by a of route discovery frequency vector (RDFV). The route 
discovery histories reveal similar characteristics and behaviors of nodes belonging to 
the same class. This feature is exploited to differentiate abnormal behavior from a 
normal one. RDFV is defined as the feature vector for detecting malicious nodes in 
MANET environment. We propose a flooding attack detection algorithm (FADA) to 
detect malicious node based on RDFV. We propose a novel flooding attacks 
prevention routing protocol (FAPRP) by incorporating the FADA algorithm and 
extending the AODV protocol. We evaluate the performance of our solution in terms 
of successful detection ratio, packet delivery ration, routing load in both normal and 
under RREQ attack scenarios using NS2 simulation. The simulation results showed 
that our approach can detected over 99% of RREQ flooding attacks, had better packet 
delivery ratio and, and routing load compared to existing solutions for RREQ 
flooding attacks, and introduced negligible overhead relative to AODV for normal 
scenarios. In this paper, the main contributions are as follows: 
(1) Introduced a new route discovery history measure, the vector of route 
discovery frequency (RDFV), to capture the behavior of MANET nodes. 
(2) Proposed a flooding attack detection algorithm (FADA), a k-nearest 
neighbors-based machine learning algorithm, using RDFV dataset to detect 
malicious nodes. 
(3) Proposed a flooding attack prevention routing protocol (FAPRP) by  
integrating FADA into the original AODV protocol. 
(4) Evaluated the effectiveness and the performance of the proposed solution for 
high-speed mobility MANETs under RREQ flooding attacks. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a review 
of the related work on detection of flooding attacks. Section 3 presents our solution 
and a novel flooding attacks prevention routing protocol (FAPRP) by improving 
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AODV protocol using FADA. Section 4 presents the results of evaluation the 
performance of the proposed solution relative to existing solutions. Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. RELATED WORKS 
2.1. Overview of AODV 
AODV is a popular reactive routing protocol in which a node only initiates the 
process for finding a path to the destination if it wants to send data. Basically, when 
the source node (NS) wants to communicate with the destination node (ND), without 
an already discovered route to the destination, NS starts a route discovery process by 
broadcasting a route request (RREQ) packet containing the destination address. The 
nodes that receive the packet will in turn broadcast it. When ND receives the packet, 
it will send a route reply (RREP) packet back to source node. Once a route has been 
discovered, HELLO and RERR packets can be used to maintain the status of the 
route. 
 
Figure 1. Description of route discovery process of AODV in the MANET 
Figure 1 describes the route discovery process of AODV, source node (N7) 
discovers route to destination node (N11) by broadcasting an RREQ to its neighbor 
nodes. When a node receives the RREQ packet for the first time, it broadcasts the 
packet  and sets up a reverse path to the source. If the node receives the same RREQ 
subsequently, it simply drops the packet. When N11 gets a RREQ, it unicasts a RREP 
packet to the source node through the established reverse {N11N10 N9 N7}. 
When N7 gets a RREP, it establishes successfully a new path to N11 with 3 hops 
routing cost and adds the new entry into its routing table. 
2.2. Flooding attacks on AODV 
Flooding attack is a form of DoS attacks in which malicious nodes broadcast the 
false packet in the network to exhaust the resources and disrupt the network 
operation. Depending upon the type of packet used to flooding the network, flooding 
attack can be categorized in three categories, RREQ, DATA and HELLO flooding 
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attack. In RREQ flooding attack, a malicious node continuously and excessively 
broadcasts fake RREQ packets, which causes a broadcast storm and floods. The 
RREQ flooding attack is considered most harmful in MANET because it can ruin the 
route discovery process by exhausting the channel bandwidths and the processing 
resources of affected nodes. In DATA flooding attack, a malicious node can 
excessively broadcast data packets to any nodes in the network. This type of attacks 
has more impact on the nodes participating in the data routing to the destinations. In 
HELLO flooding attack, nodes periodically broadcast HELLO packets to announce 
their existence to their neighbors. A malicious node abuses this feature to broadcast 
HELLO packets excessively and forces its neighbors to spend their resources on 
processing unnecessary packets. This type is only detrimental to the neighbors of a 
malicious node. Figure 2 shows the behavior of malicious nodes (M) in a MANET for 
these types of attacks. 
       
 a) RREQ flooding b) HELLO and DATA flooding 
Figure 2. Description of flooding attacks in the MANET 
2.3. Review on related research 
This section summarizes related work on threshold-based, machine learning-
based, hash function-based and digital-signature-based approaches in detecting and 
preventing flooding attacks in MANETs. Table 1 summarizes of these methods and 
their drawbacks. 
 
2.3.1. On fixed threshold-based approach 
Solutions are simple with a fixed threshold for mitigating the impact of RREQ 
flooding attacks. However, with static threshold, these methods are not suitable for 
dynamic environments where nodes are highly mobile and frequently broadcast 
route request packets.  In [15], Gada used three fixed thresholds: 
RREQ_ACCEPT_LIMIT, RREQ_BLACKLIST_LIMIT and RATE_RATELIMIT. The 
default value of RATE-RATELIMIT is 10. If the rate of receiving request packets is 
greater than RREQ_ACCEPT_LIMIT but less than RREQ_BLACKLIST_LIMIT, 
packets are simply dropped and not processed. If it is greater than 
RREQ_BLACKLIST_LIMIT, the source is declared as a malicious node. The weakness 
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of this solution is that also it may lead to blacklisting of normal nodes false positive 
problem [16] and causes excessive end-to-end delay by dropping legitimate request 
packets once the RREQ_ACCEPT_LIMIT threshold is crossed. 
In ([13][17]), the authors developed Flooding Attack Prevention (FAP) that 
prevents RREQ and DATA flooding attacks in MANETs. They argued that the 
priority of a node is adversely proportional to its broadcast frequency of RREQ. 
Hence, nodes that generate a high frequency of route requests will have a low 
priority and may be removed out of the routing process. It is suggested that a node 
should not originate more than 10 RREQ packets per second, and hence, the 
threshold of FAP is set at 15. 
In [16], Song proposed a simple technique using an Effective Filtering Scheme 
(EFS) to detect malicious nodes. This solution uses two limit values: RATE_LIMIT 
and BLACKLIST_LIMIT. If the detected RREQ rate is higher than the RATE_LIMIT 
and the BLACKLIST_LIMIT, the malicious node is declared and it will be put into 
the black list. If the rate of RREQs originated by a node is between the RATE_LIMIT 
and the BLACKLIST_LIMIT, the RREQ packet is added to a “delay queue” waiting to 
be processed. Here authors set the RATE_LIMIT threshold to 5 and set the 
BLACKLIST_LIMIT up to 10. 
 
2.3.2. On dynamic threshold-based approach 
Solutions with dynamic thresholds are more flexible as they can cope with the 
dynamic environment of MANETs. In [18], Mohammad proposed an improved 
protocol called B-AODV. In this method, each node employs a balance index (BI) for 
acceptation or rejection of RREQ packets. If the RREQ rate is higher than the BI 
value, a malicious node is defined and the RREQ packet is dropped. The results 
showed that B-AODV is resilience against RREQ flooding attacks. The main 
drawback of B-AODV is that it may drop legitimate request packets of the node 
moving at high speed as the number of request packet may be higher than the 
balance index value [19]. Also, the method does not have a confirmation mechanism 
which can identify the node properly as a malicious node.  
In  [19], Gurung proposed a new mechanism called Mitigating Flooding Attack 
Mechanism. The mechanism is based on a dynamic threshold and consists of three 
phases. It deploys special Flooding Intrusion Detection System (F-IDS) nodes to 
detect and prevent flooding attack. The F-IDS nodes are set in the promiscuous mode 
to monitor the behaviour of nodes in the network. The proposed mechanism has 
several features: (1) it uses a dynamic threshold; (2) it has a confirmation mechanism 
in which the special F-IDS node confirms the node as a malicious node by sending a 
dummy reply packet and waits for the data packets; and (3) it has a recovery 
mechanism that allows the node to participate in the network after the expiry of the 
blocking time period. However, the use of several F-IDS nodes to monitor their 
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neighbours and to communicate among them limits the performance of the overall 
network, especially when the network is not under attack. 
In [20], Tu introduced security mobile agents (SMA) to detect flooding attacks. 
An improved protocol, SMA2AODV, is proposed by integrating these SMAs into the 
discovery route process of the AODV protocol. During the training period, SMA 
agents are used to collect information for determining the minimal time-slot (the 
minimum time-slot for successfully discovered a path from a source node to a 
destination node) of the system (TSmin). After the training phase, all node (Ni) checks 
the security of the RREQ packet received from source node Nj before broadcasting it 
to the neighbors. If route discovery time-slot is smaller than the minimal time-slot of 
the system (T < TSmin), a Flooding attack is said to have occurred with Nj as the 
attacker. Ni then adds Nj into its black list. All RREQ packets of nodes in the black list 
will be dropped. The drawback of this method is that TSmin is only valid if  no 
malicious node exist during the trainig period. 
 
2.3.3. On machine learning approach 
In [21], Patel proposed the use of Support Vector Machine (SVM) algorithm for 
detecting and preventing flooding attacks . The behavior of every node is collected 
and passes to the support vector machine to decide if a node is malicious based on a 
threshold limit. 
In [22], Wenchao proposed a new intrusion detection system based on k-nearest 
neighbors (kNN) classification algorithm in wireless sensor network to separate 
abnormal nodes from normal nodes by observing their behaviors. An m-dimensional 
vector is used to represent nodes and their behavious such as the number of routing 
messages that can be sent in a period of time, the number of nodes with different 
destinations in the sending routing packets, the number of nodes with the same 
source node in the receiving routing packets.  The test results show that the system 
has high detection accuracy. The paper, however, does not present the algorithm for 
building training data sets. 
 
Table 1. Summary of drawbacks of related works for detecting flooding attacks 





Uses static threshold value which is not 
suitable for high mobility environment. 
Malicious node can pass the security 
mechanism by transmitting the RREQ 
packet at a frequency lower than the 
threshold. 
[13] FAP 2005 
[16] EFS 2006 
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[18] B-AODV 2016 Dynamic 
threshold 
It can drop the valid request packet of the 
node moving with high mobility speed if 
the number of request packet is greater than 
BI value. 
Malicious node can pass the security 
mechanism by transmitting the RREQ 
packet at a frequency lower than the 
threshold. 
[19] F-IDS 2017 Performance depend on some assumptions. 
Using new control packets (ALERT) will 
increase communication overhead and 
limination performance when operating in 
network environment without attacks. 
Malicious node can pass the security 
mechanism by transmitting the RREQ 
packet at a frequency lower than the 
threshold. 
[20] SMA2AODV 2017 There are not any malicious node exist in 
scenario during threshold value make 
phase. 
Malicious node can pass the security 
mechanism by transmitting the RREQ 
packet at a frequency lower than the 
threshold. 
[21] SVMT 2013 SVM Proposed algorithm uses fixed threshold to 
detect malicious nodes. 
[22] kNN-AODV 2014 kNN Accordance with the requirement of 
wireless sensor network intrusion detection. 
The algorithm for building training data 
sets, used in the kNN algorithm has not 
been clearly presented. 
 
3. THE PROPOSED FAPRP SOLUTION 
This section we present our algorithms and routing protocol for detecting 
flooding attacks in MANETs. First, we define the feature vector that represents the 
behavior of a node based on its history of rout discovery: the route discovery 
frequency vector (RDFV). Second, we describe an algorithm for obtaining the 
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training dataset which describes the normal behavior and the abnormal behavior of 
nodes for normal/malicious classification. Third, we present our flooding attack 
detection algorithm, and finally we present our proposed AODV-based flooding 
attacks prevention routing protocol. Table 2 defines symbols used in the paper. 
 
Table 2. Description of symbols 
Variable  Description 
ti Route discovery time i
th 
Ti Route discovery time slot i
th 
VNs Vector of route discovery frequency of NS node 
n Size of vector of route discovery frequency 
k Cutoff value for kNN algorithm 
3.1. Route discovery frequency vector 
In order to detect RREQ flooding attacks with kNN, the crucial problem is the 
selection of a feature vector that maximizes the separation of the normal and the 
malicious data classes and produces highly reliable classification. The selected 
features should be able to succinctly capture the inherent behavior of a node 
performing RREQ requests and the time-related network activities through their 
historical data records in order to differentiate “normal” from and “malicious” 
behavior. We propose a route discovery frequency vector as the feature vector for 
this purpose. To quantify this vector we define the following terms. 
 Definition 1: Route discovery time (ti), is the duration from the time a node first 
broadcasts a route discovery packet to the time it receives the corresponding 
route response. Assuming that node Ni receives the ith RREQ packet from the 
source node Ns at time si and Ni receives the route response packet at time ei, 





 Definition 2: Inter-route discovery time (Ti), is the duration from the end of a 
route discovery to the beginning of the next route discovery. Assuming that 
the node Ni receives the i+1th RREQ packet from the source node Ns at time si+1, 




In AODV routing protocol, route discovery frequency of a node depends on how 
frequent the node has to find a path to carry data to its destination. All normal nodes 
have route discovery frequencies within a range, but malicious nodes have higher 
route discovery frequencies as their aim is to flood the network. Consider Figure 2a, 
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it shows three normal nodes A, B, C and one malicious node M. Figure 3a shows the 
route discovery history of the normal node (C) as recorded by the normal node (A). 
Figure 3b shows route discovery history of the malicious node (M) that it is also 
recorded by the normal node (A). The figures show that node C sent 6 RREQ packets 
and node M sent 13 RREQ packets over roughly the same duration. 
 
a) Route discovery history off normal node (C) 
 
b) Route discovery history of malicious node (M) 
Figure 3.  Route discovery history recorded at normal node (A)  
We use a n-dimensional vector VNi (a1, a2, a3, …an) to represent route discovery 
history of node Ni, where n is the size of the vector, and ai is the ith inter-route 
discovery time. 
 Example: Route discovery history of the malicious node shown in Figure 3b is 
represented by vector VM (T1, T2, T3, T4, T5, T6, T7, T8, T9, T10, T11, T12) of size 12. 
 
Figure 4. An example describes vectors of route discovery frequency of 5 normal 
nodes (N1 to N5) and 5 malicious nodes (M1 to M5). 
Time 
 T1                         T2                 T3                                T4                         T5                    
t1                          t2                    t3                         t4                             t5                             t6 
s1         e1          s2               e2     s3       e3          s4                    e4          s5         e5                   s6           e6 
Time 
  T1         T2            T3          T4         T5          T6           T7          T8         T9        T10       T11      T12 
t1           t2         t3             t4          t5           t6               t7          t8          t9         t10        t11        t12       t13 
s1 e1     s2    e2  s3      e3  s4          e4  s5     e5    s6       e6      s7     e7 s8     e8  s9      e9 s10    e10  s11   e11 s12   e12  s13     e13 
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Figure 4 shows typical vectors of size 40 of the route discovery frequency of 
normal and malicious nodes, by NS2 simulation. It can be seen that the inter-route 
discovery time values for all normal nodes (N1 to N5) are generally larger (> 1 sec) 
than those for malicious nodes (M1 to M5) as they have low route discovery 
frequencies.  However, there are cases where the malicious inter-route discovery 
times (Ts) are indistinguishable from the normal ones. One reason for this is the 
mobility of nodes in the environment; on moving, a recording node may not receive 
RREQ packets from a malicious node until some later time. Another reason for is that 
a RREQ may be delayed in a waiting queue before being relayed, resulting in a larger 
value of T. Other reason for the overlapping region is when a malicious node floods 
the network at a frequency close to the rate at which a normal node can generate 
RREQs. As demonstrated in section 4, our proposed algorithm successfully 
recognizes these abnormal cases based on route discovery frequency feature. 
3.2. Algorithm for obtaining a training dataset 
We use NS2 [23] – version 2.35 to build a training dataset of NVC and MVC 
vector classes. The simulation scenario is set up with 100 normal nodes and 1 
malicious node, operated in the area of 2000m x 2000m. Normal nodes move under 
random waypoint model with maximum speeds 0m/s, 10m/s, 20m/s, 30m/s and 
40m/s scenarios; a malicious node is positioned at the center (1000m x 1000m) as 
shown in Figure 5. Other simulation parameters include:  AODV routing protocol, 50 
UDP connections, constant bit rate (CBR) traffic type, the first data source 
commences at time 0, other data sources commence at 5 seconds apart after the first, 
the malicious node respectively floods f packets every second (f may take on different 
values: 2, 5, 10, 50, and 100). 
 
Figure 5. Static network topology simulation for training, 50 UDPs connections, 
malicious node positioned at the square in the center 
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The training process proceeds as follows. 
Step 1: Select the dimension or size (n) of the feature vectors; 
Step 2: Set the frequency of flooding to 2 initially (f = 2 per second); 
Step 3: For each of the mobile scenarios (0m/s, 10m/s, 20m/s, 30m/s, and 40m/s), 
simulate the MANET as follows. Each node records the inter-route time of a source 
node (Ti) on receiving a RREQ from the source node i. Add Ti to the malicious history 
frequency vector if the source is malicious, otherwise it is added to the normal 
history frequency vector. At the end of this step for each scenario, two sets of vectors 
are established: 
 100 Malicious vectors: 
  100..1;,...,,, 321 jTTTTV MnMMMjM  













































Step 4: At the end of step 3 for all 5 scenarios, 100 average vectors for MVC and 100 
vectors for NVC are obtained for this particular flooding frequency (f=2); 
Step 5: The algorithm continues to establish MVC vectors and NVC vectors for other 
flooding frequencies (f = 5, 10, 50 and 100). 
As the result of the training process, a training dataset with MVC and NVC 
vectors are shown in Figure 6. The training data set is used to classify an unknown 
sample vector V (in the next section). In Figure 6, each vector is of size 60. It can be 
seen that there is an overlap between the two classes due to node mobility as well as 
the closeness of the rate of generation of RREQ packets of malicious and normal 
nodes. 
 
Figure 6. Two vectors class, black for NVC and red for MVC 
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3.3. Flooding attack detection algorithm (FADA) 
All normal nodes collect route discovery information of source nodes in the 
network. On receiving a RREQ packet, a node employs the route discovery frequency 
vector (VNs) and uses a machine learning algorithm to determine if the source node is 
normal or malicious. The kNN-Classifier based on kNN [24] algorithm is utilized to 
classify the two classes based on the route discovery frequency vectors for NVC or 
MVC. The kNN algorithm is theoretically mature with low complexity that is widely 
used for data mining. The main idea is that if most of its k-nearest neighbor belong to 
a class, the sample belongs to the same class. In kNN, the nearest neighbor refers to 
the distance between two samples and various distance metrics can be used based on 
the feature vector that represents the samples. One of the most popular choices is the 
Euclidean in (3) to calculate the distance between V1 and V2. Algorithm 1 describes 
our algorithm for recognizing malicious nodes. 








ii VVVVd  (3) 
Algorithm 1: Flooding attack detection algorithm using kNN 
Input: Two class NVC and MVC, vector of route discovery frequency (VNs) 
Output: True if VNs in NVC, else return False 
Begin 
 MAX_VECTOR = 500; 
 Double Array disMVC [MAX_VECTOR], disNVC [MAX_VECTOR]; 
 For int vt = 1 to MAX_VECTOR do { 
  disMVC[vt] = Euclidean (VNs, MVC.Vectors[vt]); 
  disNVC[vt] = Euclidean (VNs, NVC.Vectors[vt]); 
 } 
 Sort (disMVC and disNVC, ASC); // ascending sort 
 int k1 = k2 = 0; 
     While (k1 + k2 < k) { 
         if (disNVC[k1] < disMVC[k2]) k1++;               
           else k2++; 
     } 
 Return (k1 > k2); 
End 
 
3.4. FAPRP - A novel flooding attacks prevention routing protocol 
In Mobile Ad hoc Network, a source node sends and receives packets through its 
neighbor nodes. If all neighbor nodes of the source node reject packets, it will be 
isolated and cannot communicate with the other nodes in its network. In Figure 2a, 
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the malicious node M broadcasts fake RREQ packets through nodes A, B and C. If 
the neighbor nodes A, B and C reject packets from M, node M cannot carry out its 
malicious behavior. 
 
Figure 7. Request route process of FAPRP routing protocol 
In the original AODV protocol, as intermediate nodes accept all RREQ route 
discovery packets from any source nodes, hackers may exploit this vulnerability to 
perform RREQ flooding attacks. We propose the flooding attacks prevention routing 
Starts route discovery 
(Broadcasts RREQ) 
Classify vector VNs using 
kNN-Classifier; 
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protocol (FAPRP) by introducing the flooding attacks detection algorithm (FADA) 
into the route request phase of the AODV protocol. In FAPRP, only the source node’s 
neighbor nodes use FADA to detect RREQ flooding attack on receiving RREQ 
packets. Other nodes forward RREQ packets without checking for RREQ flooding 
attacks. 
Figure 7 describes how FAPRP detects an RREQ flooding attack when an 
intermediate node (Ni) receives an RREQ packet from the source node (NS). When Ni 
receives an RREQ packet, if it is not a neighbor node of Ns, it broadcasts the RREQ 
packet without checking for RREQ flooding attacks; otherwise, it handles RREQ 
packet as follows: 
 If the route discovery frequency vector of source node (VNs) is not full, Ni 
measures Ti and adds Ti to VNs, and then broadcasts the RREQ packet; 
 Else, Ni uses FADA to classify Ns using its feature vector VNs. 
 If the source node is classified malicious, the RREQ packet is dropped 
and the algorithm terminates. 
 Else, Ni removes first element from VNs and adds Ti to the last position 
of VNs; and then broadcasts the RREQ packet; 
 
4. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION BY SIMULATION 
In this section, we use  NS2 [23] – version 2.35 to evaluate the impact of RREQ 
flooding attacks on AODV and the proposed FAPRP protocol. 
4.1. Simulation settings 
Our simulation scenarios cover a 1000 meter by 1000 meter flat space, 
accommodating 50 normal mobile nodes. We consider 2 scenarios: one with a 
malicious positioned at the centre (Fig. 8a) and the other with two malicious nodes 
positioned as shown in Fig. 8b. Each malicious node may flood the network at the 
rate of  10 or 20 packets per second. 
 
Figure 8. Malicious nodes location 
 
The random waypoint [25] model is utilized as the mobility model. The 


















each simulation scenario, 20 sources transmit data at a constant bit rate (CBR). Each 
source transmits 512-byte data packets at the rate of 2 packets/second. The first 
source emits data at time 0, the following sources transmit data at 10 seconds apart. 
All parameters are described in Table 3. 
Table 3. Simulation parameters 
Parameters Setting 
Simulation area 1000 x 1000 (m2) 
Simulation time 500 (second) 
Number of normal nodes 50 (nodes) 
Node transmission range (R) 250 (m) 
Number of malicious nodes 1, 2 (nodes) 
Attacks frequency 10, 20 (packet/second) 
Maximum speeds 1..10, 1..20 and 1..30 (m/s) 
Traffic type CBR (constant bit rate) 
Transport protocol UDP 
Traffic type CBR (constant bit rate) 
Number of traffic 20 
Data rate  2 (packet/second) 
Packet size  512 (bytes) 
Queue type FIFO (DropTail) 
Routing protocols AODV, B-AODV [18], FAPRP 
Size of vector (n) 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40 and 60 
Cutoff value (k) 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45 and 50 
Distance type Euclid 
 
We evaluate the original AODV, the B-AODV, and our proposed protocol 
(FAPRP) and compare their performance with and without RREQ flooding attacks in 
terms of Attacks detection ratio, Packet delivery ratio, End-to-end delay, and Routing 
load metrics. 
 Attacks detection ratio (ADR) is calculated using equation (4). AT is the number 
of RREQ packets that are accepted true, the packets come from normal nodes; 
AF is the number of RREQ packets that are accepted false, the packets come 
from malicious nodes; DT is the number of RREQ packets that are dropped true, 
the packets come from malicious nodes; DF is the number of RREQ packets that 











 Packet delivery ratio (DPR): The ratio of the received packets by the destination 


















PDR  (5) 
 End-to-end delay (ETE): This is the average delay between the sending time of a 
data packet by the CBR source and its reception at the corresponding CBR 
receiver (eqn 6), where iDATAT  is the delay time for sending i








DATA 1  
(6) 
 Routing load (RL): This is the ratio of the overhead control packets sent (or 
forwarded) to successfully deliver data packets. Routing discovery packets 




















RL  (7) 
4.2. Simulation results 
4.2.1. Effects of flooding attacks on the original AODV protocol 
In this section we evaluate the performance of the AODV protocol with and 
without RREQ flooding attacks. We simulate 15 scenarios to evaluate the impact on 
the performance of AODV in terms of the above 4 defined metrics under various 
conditions including node mobility speeds, flooding frequencies,  and malicious 
nodes. The main purpose of an RREQ flooding attack is to inject a large number of 
fake RREQ packets into the network making it less efficient in delivering legitimate 
packets. This effect is equivalent to handling excessive overhead packets causing a 
decrease in the network’s packet delivery ratio, an increase in the average end-to-end 
packet delay, and an increase in the network’s routing load. The simulation results 
are shown in Table 4. 
Table 4. AODV performances under flooding attacks 
MN 
PDR (%) RL (pkt) ETE (sec) 
1..10m/s 1..20m/s 1..30m/s 1..10m/s 1..20m/s 1..30m/s 1..10m/s 1..20m/s 1..30m/s 
0 89.19 86.28 84.90 3.85 4.66 5.64 0.420 0.449 0.595 
1 28.75 26.03 14.74 139.08 155.85 288.98 3.143 3.290 4.108 
2 13.36 10.33 3.83 464.98 624.38 1,700.94 4.959 3.397 4.860 
 
Figure 9 shows that the packet delivery ratio decreases, the routing load 
increases, and the end-to-end delay increases when the intruder floods attacking 
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packets. Figure 9a shows that without flooding attack, the AODV packet delivery 
ratio is above 84.9% and most packets reach their the destination nodes. However, 
the packet delivery ratio reduced drastically to 13.36% when the intruder uses 2 
malicious nodes and floods 20 packets every second. Figure 9b shows the average 
end-to-end delay increases as the flooding attack frequency increases. When the 
attacker uses 1 malicious nodes and broadcasts 10 RREQ packets every second, the 
average end-to-end delay changes from 0.42s before the attack to 0.984s after the 
attack for the 10m/s scenario. When the 2 malicious nodes broadcasts 20 RREQ 
packets every second, the average end-to-end delay changes from 0.595s before the 
attack to 4.860 s after the attack for the 30m/s scenario. Figure 9c shows the routing 
load increases as the flooding attack frequency increases. When the attacker uses 1 
malicious nodes and broadcasts 10 RREQ packets every second, the routing load 
changes from 3.85pkt before the attack to 23.74pkt after the attack for the 10m/s 
scenario. When the 2 malicious nodes broadcasts 20 RREQ packets every second, the 
routing load changes from 5.64pkt before the attack to 1,700.94pkt after the attack for 
the 30m/s scenario. 
  
 a) Packet delivery ratio b) End-to-end delay  
  
c) Routing load 
Figure 9. AODV performance under RREQ flooding attacks 
4.2.2. Flooding attacks detection performance of FAPRP 
In this section we evaluate the malicious node detection performance of the 
proposed solution. Malicious node detection ratio is defined in (4). 216 scenarios are 
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simulated: RDFV of size 10, 15¸ 20, 25, 30, 35, 40 and 60; the cut off values of k for 
kNN are set at 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45 and 50. Nodes move in a Random Way 
Point pattern with a specified maximum speed of 10m/s, 20m/s and 30 m/s. 20 
source-destination UDP connections are set up among nodes. The intruder uses 2 
malicious nodes and floods 20 packets every second.  
The results in Figure 10 show that by making use of the route discovery history 
feature vector and the kNN machine data mining algorithm, our method achieves 
high malicious nodes detection ratio and the complexity of the overall detection 
algorithm is proportional to the size of the vector. We see that the detection rate of 
FAPRP is above 99.0% and the mistaken rate is below 1.0% for all scenarios using 
vector sizes larger than 35. Figure 10d shows that the average of the maximum 
successful detection rate of FAPRP is above 99.82% when the cutoff value is 30 and 
vector size is 60. In brief, the proposed solution is effective in detecting the RREQ 
flooding attacks. 
 
a) 1-10 m/s mobility speed 
 





c) 1-30 m/s mobility speed 
 
d) Average of mobility speed 
Figure 10. Malicious nodes successful detection ratio 
 
4.2.3. Performance evaluation of AODV, B-AODV and FAPRP 
In this section we simulate 27 scenarios to evaluate the performance of the 
AODV, B-AODV and FAPRP protocols under RREQ flooding attacks. The cutoff 
value (k) is 30 and vector size (n) is 60. All nodes move in a Random Way Point 
pattern with specified maximum speeds of 10m/s, 20m/s and 30 m/s. 2 malicious 
nodes, each floods 20 packets every second. 20 pairs of communicating nodes are set 
up among source nodes. The simulation results are shown in Table 5. 
a) Packet Delivery Ratio: The results in Figure 11a show that the average packet 
delivery ratio for mobility speed by AODV is about 86.79% in the absence of a 
malicious node. When there is one malicious node, the packet delivery ratio is about 
23.17%, and 9.17% for two one malicious nodes. This is due to RREQ flooding of the 
fake route request packets by the malicious node, resulting in a high consumption of 
bandwidth and buffer overloads at intermediate nodes with fake RREQs. For B-
AODV in normal scenarios, the average packet delivery ratio is about 59.92%. In 
flooding scenarios, B-AODV average packet delivery ratio is above 56.17% when the 
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intruder uses one or two malicious nodes. When our proposed solution is deployed, 
the packet delivery ratio for normal scenarios and high mobility speed is about 
86.67%. Under flooding scenarios, FAPRP packet delivery ratio is above 85.02% when 
the intruder uses one or two malicious nodes. In brief, our solution is more efficient 
compared to AODV and B-AODV under normal network operation scenarios and 
more effective in handling RREQ flooding attacks with higher correct detection rates. 
Table 5. AODV, B-AODV and FAPRP performances 
1..10m/s 
  PDR (%) RL (pkt) ETE (sec) 
MN AODV BAODV FAPRP AODV BAODV FAPRP AODV BAODV FAPRP 
0 89.19 58.81 88.2 3.85 2.2 3.82 0.420 0.827 0.457 
1 28.75 61.39 87.12 139.08 3.32 5.17 3.143 0.689 0.425 
2 13.36 56.28 88.25 464.98 5.43 6.15 4.959 0.734 0.386 
1..20m/s 
0 86.28 65.39 87.39 4.66 2.98 4.43 0.449 1.384 0.466 
1 26.03 51.54 84.75 155.85 3.87 5.88 3.290 0.983 0.548 
2 10.33 56.62 85.22 624.38 5.93 6.85 3.397 1.143 0.617 
1..30m/s 
0 84.90 55.57 84.43 5.64 2.67 5.44 0.595 1.743 0.622 
1 14.74 53.96 83.19 288.98 3.55 6.55 4.108 1.359 0.646 
2 3.83 55.62 83.87 1700.94 5.42 7.79 4.860 1.126 0.740 
Average 
0 86.79 59.92 86.67 4.72 2.62 4.56 0.488 1.318 0.515 
1 23.17 55.63 85.02 194.64 3.58 5.87 3.514 1.010 0.540 
2 9.17 56.17 85.78 930.10 5.59 6.93 4.405 1.001 0.581 
 
b) End-to-end delay: The results in Figure 11b show that with AODV, the average 
end-to-end delay is about 0.488s under normal scenarios. The end-to-end delays are 
about 3.514s and 4.405s for one and two one malicious nodes respectively. This high 
end-to-end delay is caused by the broadcasting of selective fake route request packets 
by the malicious nodes. For B-AODV under normal scenarios, the average end-to-
end delay is about 1.138s. Under flooding scenarios, B-AODV end-to-end delay is 
about 1.010s with one malicious node and 1.001s with two malicious nodes. This is 
caused by the failure of B-AODV in detecting and preventing flooding attacks 
resulting in lower packet delivery ratios and longer route discovery delays. For our 
proposed solution, the average end-to-end delay for normal scenarios and mobility 
speed is about 0.515s. Under flooding attacks, FAPRP average end-to-end delays are 
about 0.540s and 0.581s when intruder uses one and two malicious nodes 
respectively. Clearly, FAPPRP achieves shorter end-to-end delay compared to AODV 
and B-AODV under both normal and flooding attack scenarios. 
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c) Routing load: The results in Figure 11c show that the average routing load for 
high mobility speed by AODV is about 4.72pkt in the absence of a malicious node. 
The routing loads are about 194.64pkts and 930.1pkts for one and two one malicious 
nodes respectively. The high routing load is caused by the broadcasting of selective 
fake route request packets by the malicious nodes. For B-AODV in normal scenarios, 
the routing load is about 2.62pkt. B-AODV average routing load in attacks state is 
about 3.58pkt when the intruder uses one malicious node and 5.59pkt for two 
malicious nodes. For our proposed solution, the routing load for normal scenario and 
high mobility speed is about 4.56pkt. Under flooding attacks, FAPRP average routing 
load is about 5.87pkts and 6.93pkts when the intruder uses one and two malicious 
nodes respectively. B-AODV routing load is, however, better as compared to AODV 
as it drops many route request packets due to mistake detection. Overall, FAPRP 
performs as well as AODV in the routing load measure under both normal and 
flooding attack scenarios due to its high correct detection rate and low mistake rate. 
 
a) Packet delivery ratio 
 




c) Routing load  
Figure 11. AODV, B-AODV and FAPRP performances under RREQ flooding attacks 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we introduced the flooding attack detection algorithm (FADA) 
based on our proposed route discovery frequency history feature vector and the 
kNN data mining algorithm to detect and isolate the malicious nodes in the network. 
We introduced a new FAPRP protocol by integrating FADA into the route request 
phase of AODV. The simulation results show that FADA achieves malicious nodes 
successful detection ratio much higher (above 99.0%) than those of existing 
algorithms, and low mistaken rate (below 1.0%). Furthermore, the proposed solution 
is efficient in that it improves the network performance in terms of higher packet 
delivery ratio, smaller end-to-end delay and reduces the routing load compared to 
AODV and B-AODV protocols. 
The limitation of our solution is that it does not deal with spoofing route request 
flooding attacks and data flooding attacks. In the future, we will extend the proposed 
solution for mitigating the effects of these attacks. 
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